



ANALYSIS OF FIQH SIYASAH ON SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE BENEFIT OF THE UMMAH AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

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Abstract: Social assistance (bansos) is a principal instrument of the Indonesian government for poverty alleviation. The social protection budget rose from IDR 431.5 trillion in 2022 to IDR 508.2 trillion in the 2026 draft. Comparative data for 2022–2025, however, indicate that this budgetary increase did not proportionally accelerate poverty reduction and instead shows a sharp rise coinciding with the 2024 general election cycle, raising suspicion of electoral motives behind the policy. This study analyzes Indonesia's social assistance policies for 2022–2026 through the lens of fiqh siyasah, focusing on the concepts of ummah, siyasah 'adilah, tamkin, and amanah. Employing a normative-qualitative method with a library-research approach, the study examines official data from the Central Statistics Agency and the Ministry of Finance, corroborated with media reports, classical and contemporary fiqh siyasah literature, and related scientific studies. Findings reveal that the social protection budget increased by 12 percent in the 2024 election year compared to the previous year and was accompanied by indications of program personalization and disbursement scheduling aligned with campaign stages and voting day. Such electoralized distribution conflicts with the principles of maslahah mursalah and siyasah 'adilah in fiqh siyasah, which prioritize comprehensive and sustainable public welfare. The persistence of beneficiary dependency, stemming from insufficient empowerment (tamkin) programs, violates the principle of kifayah. Moreover, the politicization of social assistance constitutes an abuse of leadership trust (amanah), neglecting the ruler's moral responsibility toward the people, despite the budget's procedural approval by the legislature. The study concludes that aligning social protection policies with fiqh siyasah principles requires depoliticized, empowerment-oriented, and sustainably targeted interventions to realize equitable maslahah for the ummah.

Keywords: Social assistance; *fiqh siyasah*; the welfare of the people; poverty; Electoral politics

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Abstrak: Bantuan sosial (bansos) merupakan salah satu instrumen kebijakan utama pemerintah Indonesia dalam penanggulangan kemiskinan. Anggaran perlindungan sosial mengalami peningkatan dari Rp431,5 triliun pada 2022 menjadi Rp508,2 triliun pada rancangan 2026. Namun, data komparatif periode 2022-2025 menunjukkan bahwa kenaikan tersebut tidak berbanding lurus dengan percepatan penurunan kemiskinan dan justru menunjukkan pola peningkatan tajam yang bertepatan dengan siklus pemilihan umum 2024, hal ini memunculkan dugaan adanya motif elektoral di balik kebijakan tersebut. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis kebijakan bansos di Indonesia periode 2022-2026 dari perspektif fiqh siyasah, khususnya dalam kerangka kemaslahahan umat, siyasah 'adilah, tamkin, dan amanah. Metode yang digunakan adalah penelitian normatif-kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kepustakaan (library research), dengan menelaah data resmi Badan Pusat Statistik dan Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia yang ditriangulasi dengan pemberitaan media, serta literatur klasik maupun kontemporer terkait fiqh siyasah, juga penelitian ilmiah terkait. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa anggaran perlindungan sosial pada tahun Pemilu 2024 naik 12 persen dibanding tahun sebelumnya dan disertai indikasi personalisasi program serta penjadwalan pencairan yang bertepatan dengan tahapan kampanye dan hari pemungutan suara. Sehingga kebijakan bansos yang didistribusikan dengan pertimbangan elektoral bertentangan dengan prinsip masalah mursalah dan siyasah 'adilah dalam fiqh siyasah yang menekankan orientasi kebijakan pada kemaslahahan yang menyeluruh dan berkelanjutan. Ketergantungan struktural penerima manfaat akibat minimnya program pemberdayaan (tamkin) juga ditemukan bertentangan dengan prinsip kifayah. Politisasi bansos dikategorikan sebagai bentuk penyalahgunaan amanah kepemimpinan yang mengabaikan tanggung jawab moral penguasa kepada rakyat, sekalipun secara prosedural anggaran tersebut telah disetujui oleh lembaga legislatif.

Kata Kunci: Bantuan sosial; fiqh siyasah; kemaslahahan umat; kemiskinan; politik elektoral

INTRODUCTION

Poverty in Indonesia is still a multidimensional problem influenced by structural inequality, weak access to basic services, and limited effectiveness of social policies. Data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) recorded a gradual decrease in the number of poor people from 26.36 million people (9.57 percent) in September 2022 to 23.36 million people (8.25 percent) in September 2025.¹ Although this trend is positive, the rate of

¹ Infobanknews, "BPS: Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Indonesia Turun Jadi 23,85 Juta per Maret 2025," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://infobanknews.com/bps-jumlah-penduduk-miskin-indonesia-turun-jadi-2385-juta-per-maret-2025>; BPS, "Persentase Penduduk Miskin September 2025 Turun Menjadi 8,25 Persen," Retrieved 2 July 2026,

decline is slow and disproportionate to the amount of social protection budget that continues to increase in the same period, from IDR 431.5 trillion in 2022 to IDR 508.2 trillion in the 2026 draft.² The disparity between the amount of the budget and the results of poverty alleviation is a relevant starting point to be studied further, not only in terms of program effectiveness, but also in terms of normative legitimacy of the policy itself.

The problem becomes more complex when the pattern of increasing the social assistance budget is strongly correlated with the electoral political cycle. In the 2024 election year, the social protection budget jumped to IDR 496.8 trillion, an increase of 11.6 percent or IDR 53.3 trillion compared to the previous year's realization of IDR 443.4 trillion,³ accompanied by the scheduling of the disbursement of a number of programs that coincided with the campaign stage and voting day. This pattern was then corrected down to Rp468.1 trillion in the 2025 outlook, a year without a presidential election agenda.⁴ This pattern of ups and downs that coincide with the electoral cycle is an empirical indication of what in the political economy literature is referred to as the political budget cycle, which is the manipulation of fiscal instruments by the incumbent to maximize voter support ahead of the vote. Legally positive, Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections prohibits the use of state facilities for campaign purposes, but does not regulate in detail the boundary between legitimate social policies and the instrumentalization of social assistance for electoral purposes, thus creating a regulatory gap that allows the practice to take place without clear sanctions.

Normatively, the social assistance program is designed as a *social safety net* that aims to break the chain of poverty structurally through the fulfillment of basic needs and capacity building of beneficiaries. However, empirically, for example, the effectiveness of social assistance in reducing poverty is still very limited, because this program is more charitable than transformative.⁵ Social assistance has not been able to encourage the

<https://www.bps.go.id/id/pressrelease/2026/02/05/2536/persentase-penduduk-miskin-september-2025-turun--menjadi-8-25-persen-.html>

² Badan Pusat Statistik, "Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Menurut Provinsi Dan Daerah," Retrieved 19 June 2026 2026, <https://www.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/MTg1IzI=/jumlah-penduduk-miskin--ribu-jiwa--menurut-provinsi-dan-daerah.html>.

³ ANTARA News, "Menkeu: Anggaran perlindungan sosial bukan hanya lewat Kemensos," 25 Maret 2024, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4026849/menkeu-anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-bukan-hanya-lewat-kemensos>; Liputan6.com, "Infografis Usulan Penundaan Penyaluran Bansos Saat Tahun Pemilu," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5500210/infografis-usulan-penundaan-penyaluran-bansos-saat-tahun-pemilu>.

⁴ Validnews.id, "Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial Tahun 2026 Meningkatkan Jadi Rp508,2 Triliun," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://validnews.id/ekonomi/anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-tahun-meningkat-jadi-rp-triliun>.

⁵ Palupi Lindiasari Samputra and Aji Wahyu Ramadhani, "Efektivitas Bantuan Sosial Dalam Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Di Tengah Perlambatan Ekonomi Indonesia Dengan

economic independence of recipients, especially after the pandemic, where the pattern of dependence on assistance has actually strengthened.⁶ This is due to various factors, including weaknesses in program design, lack of transparency in implementation, and structural inequality in the distribution of resources.

In Islamic law, public policy issues that concern the interests of the wider community are part of the study of *fiqh siyasah*, that is, a discipline that discusses governance and politics based on the principles of Islamic law, including aspects of leadership, public policy, and the relationship between the ruler and the people.⁷ Every government policy within this framework must be accountable not only legally positively, but also morally and ethically based on Islamic values. The principles of *fiqh siyasah* such as *maslahah mursalah* (the benefit of the ummah), *siyasah 'adilah* (just policy), *tamkin* (empowerment), and *amanah* (leadership responsibility) conceptually provide a framework for assessing whether a public policy is truly oriented to the interests of the people or contrary to the goals of sharia.

The study of *fiqh siyasah* on social assistance policies in Indonesia is relevant for several reasons. First, practically Indonesia is a country with a majority Muslim population,⁸ so the normative approach based on Islamic values has real relevance in the formation of equitable public policies. Second, the principles of *fiqh siyasah* such as *maslahah mursalah*, *siyasah 'adilah*, and *tamkin* provide an analytical framework to assess the quality of a public policy. Third, this study aims to bring together two study domains that have been running in parallel, namely social policy analysis and *fiqh siyasah*, to produce a more comprehensive assessment of the phenomenon of politicization of social assistance.

This study aims to analyze social assistance policies in Indonesia for the 2022-2026 period from the perspective of *fiqh siyasah*, by assessing its conformity to the principles of the benefit of the ummah and identifying the ethical-normative implications of the politicization of social assistance in electoral contestation, based on verified official government data and presented comparatively. The results of this research are expected to make an academic contribution to the development of *contemporary fiqh siyasah* studies as well as provide fair policy recommendations.

Pendekatan Non-Parametrik," *JURNAL PERSPEKTIF EKONOMI DARUSSALAM* 5, no. 1 (October 7, 2019): 9-31, <https://doi.org/10.24815/jped.v5i1.14227>.

⁶ Nanda Salsabila et al., "Analisis Efektivitas Bantuan Sosial (Bansos) Dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan Di Indonesia," *Journal of Macroeconomics and Social Development* 1, no. 4 (June 13, 2024): 1-13, <https://doi.org/10.47134/jmsd.v1i4.317>.

⁷ Adinda Dwi Putri et al., "Fiqih siyasah Dalam Pembelajaran Islam," *MARAS: Jurnal Penelitian Multidisiplin* 2, no. 1 (January 23, 2024): 218-30, <https://doi.org/10.60126/maras.v2i1.169>.

⁸ Pew Research Center, "Religious Compositions by Country, 2010-2020," Pew Research Center, 2025, <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/feature/religious-composition-by-country-2010-2020/>, Retrieved 12 June 2026.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a normative-qualitative legal research method with a *library research approach*. This approach was chosen because the object of the research study is doctrinal and conceptual, namely analyzing social assistance policies through the normative perspective of *fiqh siyasah* without involving the collection of field data. The primary data sources in this study were obtained from searching books, scientific journals, classical texts and other sources that are still relevant in the field of *siyasah fiqh*, especially works that discuss the principles of *siyasah syar'iyah*, *maslahah mursalah*, and the concept of Islamic leadership. Among the primary sources used are the book *Al-Siyasah al-Syar'iyah* by Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-Mustasfa* by Imam al-Ghazali, and other *works of fiqh siyasah*. Secondary data sources include official releases by the Central Statistics Agency regarding the poverty profile for the period September 2022 to September 2025, official data from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the realization and allocation of the social protection budget for the 2022-2026 period, the results of academic research that have been published in scientific journals, as well as reliable news sources that contain data and facts related to the implementation of social assistance and its political dynamics. To ensure the validity of the figures, budget and poverty data are triangulated between official releases of government agencies (BPS and the Ministry of Finance) and mainstream media reports that cite authorized officials directly, then presented tabular to show trends over the past three years. Data analysis uses *content analysis* and deductive-normative methods, namely applying the principles of *fiqh siyasah* as a tool for analysis of the empirical facts of social assistance policies in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Poverty Dynamics and Social Protection Budget, 2022-2026

The development of the national poverty rate and the amount of the social protection budget in recent years need to be examined gradually before they are associated with the framework of *fiqh siyasah*, because the movement pattern of each indicator is the basis of the argument in the next part of the analysis. Table 1 presents the development of the national poverty rate based on the official release of BPS in the seven periods of data collection of the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) from September 2022 to September 2025.

Table 1: National Poverty Rate Development,
September 2022 - September 2025

No	Period	Total Poor Population (million people)	Percentage (%)
1	September 2022	26,36	9,57
2	March 2023	25,09	9,36
3	March 2024	25,22	9,03
4	September 2024	24,06	8,57
5	March 2025	23,85	8,47
6	September 2025	23,36	8,25

Data Source: BPS (2025, 2026); Infobanknews (2025); Indonesiabaik.id (2026).⁹

Indications of Politicization in the 2024 Election Cycle show a consistent but slowing trend of poverty reduction, with an average decrease of around 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points per semester since March 2023. This pattern is used as a comparison with Table 2, which presents the development of the social protection budget in the same period.

Table 2: State Budget Social Protection (Perlinsos), 2022-2026

No	Year	Value (Rp trillion)	Status	Remarks
1	2022	431,5	State Budget Allocation	A year without a national election agenda
2	2023	443,4	Realization	Up 2.8% from 2022; year ahead of the 2024 election
3	2024	496,8	Allocation	Election Year; up 12.0% (IDR 53.3 trillion) from the realization in 2023
4	2025	503.2 (Initial) / 468.1 (Outlook)	The allocation is then revised	Post-election year; Revised downwards due to spending efficiency

⁹ Badan Pusat Statistik, "Persentase Penduduk Miskin September 2025 Turun Menjadi 8,25 Persen," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.bps.go.id/id/pressrelease/2026/02/05/2536/persentase-penduduk-miskin-september-2025-turun--menjadi-8-25-persen-.html>; Infobanknews, "BPS: Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Indonesia Turun Jadi 23,85 Juta per Maret 2025," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://infobanknews.com/bps-jumlah-penduduk-miskin-indonesia-turun-jadi-2385-juta-per-maret-2025>; Indonesiabaik.id, "Tingkat Kemiskinan Indonesia dalam Satu Dekade Terakhir," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://indonesiabaik.id/infografis/tingkat-kemiskinan-indonesia-dalam-satu-dekade-terakhir>.

5	2026	508,2	RAPBN	Up 8.6% from the 2025 outlook; A Year Without a National Election Agenda
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Data Sources: *Indonesia.go.id* (2022); *ANTARA News* (2024); *Liputan6.com* (2024); *CNBC Indonesia* (2024); *Validnews.id* (2025); *Tempo.co* (2025).¹⁰

From the two tables, it shows patterns that need to be observed. The sharpest increase in the social protection budget in the non-pandemic period occurred in 2024, the year the Presidential and Vice Presidential General Elections and the Legislative Elections were held, while the rate of poverty reduction in the same period did not show a commensurate acceleration, from 9.36 percent (March 2023) to 9.03 percent (March 2024), only down 0.33 percentage points. On the contrary, in 2025, a year without a presidential election agenda, the social protection budget will be corrected down by 7 percent from the initial allocation. The pattern of concentrated increases in the electoral year and the correction of the decline in the non-electoral year is consistent with the concept of the political budget cycle that has been identified in the practice of providing social assistance grants by incumbent candidates in the regional head elections,¹¹ and reinforces the suspicion that part of the 2024 budget increase is driven by electoral considerations, not solely by the real need for poverty reduction, which in fact is slowing down.

Indications of Politicization in the 2024 Election Cycle

In addition to the macro pattern at the budget level, indications of politicization are also seen in the micro-scheduling of the distribution of a number of social assistance programs ahead of voting day on February 14, 2024, as summarized in Table 3.

¹⁰ *Indonesia.go.id*, "Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial Tetap Disiapkan," <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/editorial/5569/anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-tetap-disiapkan?lang=1>; *ANTARA News*, "Menkeu: Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial Bukan Hanya Lewat Kemensos," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4026849/menkeu-anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-bukan-hanya-lewat-kemensos>; *Liputan6.com*, "Infografis Usulan Penundaan Penyaluran Bansos Saat Tahun Pemilu," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5500210/infografis-usulan-penundaan-penyaluran-bansos-saat-tahun-pemilu>; *CNBC Indonesia*, "Defisit APBN 2025 2,5%, Sri Mulyani Waspada Risiko Ini," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20241211102224-4-594982/>; *Validnews.id*, "Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial Tahun 2026 Meningkatkan Jadi Rp508,2 Triliun," 15 Agustus 2025, <https://validnews.id/ekonomi/anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-tahun-meningkat-jadi-rp-triliun>; *Tempo.co*, "Sri Mulyani Beberkan Peruntukan Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial Rp508 Triliun," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/sri-mulyani-beberkan-peruntukan-anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-rp-508-triliun--2059476>.

¹¹ Abdul Rahman Mansyur, "Pengaruh Kebijakan Restriksi Pemberian Hibah Bansos Terhadap Politisasi Anggaran Oleh Calon Incumbent Pada Pilkada Kabupaten/Kota Tahun 2017," *Jurnal Kebijakan Ekonomi* 17, no. 1 (2022): 1-14, <https://doi.org/10.21002/jke.2022.01>.

Table 3: Chronology of Social Assistance Distribution Ahead of the 2024 Election

No	Programs	Distribution Period	Goals and Values	Time Record
1	BLT El Nino	November-December 2023	IDR 400,000/KPM for 18.8 million KPM	Coinciding with the initial stages of the election campaign (starting November 28, 2023)
2	10 kg rice social assistance	Extended until June 2024 (originally planned to end November 2023)	22 million MOE	The extension was announced during the campaign, close to the vote
3	BLT Food Risk Mitigation	January-March 2024, rapped and disbursed February 2024	IDR 600,000/KPM (3-month report), 18.8 million KPM, total IDR 11.25 trillion	Disbursement is scheduled to be close to voting day on February 14, 2024

Data Source: Kompas.com (2024); Kompas.tv (2024); Bisnis.com (2024).¹²

The three programs in Table 3 show a pattern that a number of parties, including the Chairman of the Budget Agency of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and a number of economists, consider strange in terms of time,¹³ the disbursement of the Food Risk Mitigation BLT for three months is deliberately rapped and scheduled to be disbursed in February, a day to a week before voting day, instead of being disbursed in stages according to the monthly needs of the recipients. This pattern cannot be explained solely by administrative technical reasons, because the disbursement file actually adds to the complexity of

¹² Kompas.com, "Data dan Fakta: Anggaran Bansos Meningkat Jelang Pemilu 2024," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.kompas.com/cekfakta/read/2024/02/01/181628182/>; Kompas.tv, "Kucuran Bansos di Tahun Pemilu 2024 Lebih Besar dari Pandemi Covid-19 2021-2022," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.kompas.tv/nasional/481565/kucuran-bansos-di-tahun-pemilu-2024-lebih-besar-dari-pandemi-covid-19-2021-2022?page=all>; Bisnis.com, "Cek Fakta: Bansos Jelang Pilpres 2024 Tertinggi Sepanjang Sejarah?," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20240202/9/1737706/>.

¹³ Kompas.id, "Gelontoran Bansos di Tahun Pemilu," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2024/01/04/gelontoran-bansos-di-tahun-pemilu>.

distribution compared to the usual monthly scheme. However, the results of the post-election Kompas R&D exit poll show that the influence of social assistance on the electability of presidential candidate pairs is not linear or direct, but rather plays a role in strengthening electability that has increased since the candidate pairs were inaugurated at the end of October 2023.¹⁴ This finding is methodologically important: the politicization of social assistance does not have to be proven to causally affect the outcome of the election in order to be considered normatively problematic, because in the framework of *fiqh siyasah* what is in question is not its electoral effectiveness, but the legitimacy of the intention and procedure behind the timing of the policy itself, as will be described in the analysis section.

Furthermore, elections that are colored by money politics have the potential to trigger disputes over election results which can ultimately lead to re-voting, both at the election and regional election levels. This condition brings serious consequences in the form of wasting the state budget that should be allocated for more productive interests. Thus, instead of strengthening democracy, money politics actually undermines democratic values in any constitutional system. Money politics is actually the opposite of the spirit and goals that are to be achieved through the holding of general elections, especially in the context of Indonesia. Money politics and the politicization of social assistance basically run continuously. Socio-economic assistance can be defined as the use of state-financed social assistance programs as an instrument to obtain or maintain electoral political support, both by the government and other political actors.

In the 2024 election in Indonesia, this pattern was identified from a drastic increase in the distribution of social assistance compared to the previous period, which was accompanied by various reports regarding indications of program personalization and the involvement of state officials in the distribution of aid directly to prospective voters.¹⁵ In terms of positive law, the politicization of social assistance contains a number of juridical problems. Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections regulates the prohibition for state officials to use state facilities for campaign purposes. However, the boundary between legitimate social policies and the instrumentalization of social assistance for electoral purposes is in many cases still legally ambiguous. This creates loopholes that allow practices to

¹⁴ Kompas.id, "Bansos, Pendongkrak Suara Prabowo-Gibran?," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2024/02/24/bansos-pendongkrak-suara-prabowo-gibran>.

¹⁵ Akhmad Zuhad Haekal et al., "Problematisasi Hukum Pemberian Bantuan Sosial Pada Masa Pemilu," *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory* 3, no. 1 (February 2, 2025): 30–40, <https://doi.org/10.62976/ijjel.v3i1.861>.

occur that substantially undermine electoral integrity.¹⁶ Indicators of politicization of social assistance include at least three things: first, electoral timing, which is an increase in the number of recipients and a significant value of assistance ahead of the election; second, program personalization, which is an effort to associate the social assistance program with a certain political figure or figure; third, bias in determining beneficiaries that is not entirely based on real welfare data.¹⁷

The Principles of *Fiqh Siyasaḥ* as a Framework for Analysis

Fiqh siyasaḥ is etymologically derived from the words *fiqh* (deep understanding) and *siyasaḥ* (governing or leading). Terminologically, according to Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, *siyasaḥ* is a set of laws and regulations set by the state to create order and bring prosperity to its people.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Abdurrahman defines *siyasaḥ* as policies and laws made to regulate various affairs of the ummah within the framework of government and judiciary, which all boil down to the achievement of fame.¹⁹ The main basis of *siyasaḥ shari'iyah* is the belief that the Islamic sharia was revealed for the benefit of mankind in this world and the hereafter, by upholding the law as justly as possible, although the method is not always explicitly found in the Qur'an and Sunnah.²⁰ Therefore, the most relevant approaches in *siyasaḥ* are *qiyas* and *maslahah mursalah*, as a method of *ijtihad* to answer contemporary problems that do not have a direct precedent in primary sources of law.

In public policy, there are several principles of *fiqh siyasaḥ* that are relevant to assess social assistance policies. First, the principle of *maslahah*, Al-Ghazali explained that *maslahah* is everything that maintains the purpose of sharia (*maqashid sharia*), which is to maintain the five main things (*al-kulliyat al-khams*): religion, soul, intellect, descent, and property.²¹ If it is associated with the government, then the establishment

¹⁶ Anggraeinni Anggraeinni et al., "Bantuan Sosial Sebagai Instrumen Politik Uang Non-Tunai dalam Pemilu Indonesia," *Jurnal USM Law Review* 9, no. 2 (2026): 1253-1272, <https://doi.org/https://journals.usm.ac.id/index.php/julr/article/view/13655/7136>.

¹⁷ Willya Achmad, "Politics and Social Welfare: Dynamics or Social Assistance Programs on Electability in Indonesia," *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)* 9, no. 2 (May 23, 2024): 205-15, <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v9i2.53634>.

¹⁸ Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, *Al-Siyasaḥ al-Syar'iyah* (Kairo: Dar al-Anshar, 1977), h. 4-5. Dikutip dalam Muhammad Rosyidi, "Penerapan *Fiqh siyasaḥ* Dalam Ketatanegaraan Indonesia," *Awig Awig: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan Dan Ilmu Hukum* 4, no. 1 (2024): 65-76, https://jurnal.elkatarie.ac.id/index.php/awig_awig/article/view/309.

¹⁹ Abdurrahman, *Perkembangan Pemikiran Fiqh pada Fiqh Indonesia* (Jakarta: Akademika Pressindo, 1990), h. 12.

²⁰ Rosyidi, "Penerapan *Fiqh siyasaḥ* Dalam Ketatanegaraan Indonesia."

²¹ Imam al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Ushul* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1993), h. 174. Dikutip dalam Iksir Alkholy Rizman, Saipul Umami, and Riki Andika Putra, "Equality: Law and Social Penerapan Prinsip *Fiqh siyasaḥ* Dalam Kepemimpinan Modern: Perspektif Ulama Klasik

of policies that bring benefits and reject harm to the wider community, although in this case there is no special postulate that explicitly mentions it. Imam al-Ghazali emphasized that the purpose of the sharia is that any government policy that is not oriented towards the maintenance of these five main things can be considered contrary to the principle of *maslahah*.

Second, the principle of *siyasaḥ 'adilah* (just policy). This principle emphasizes that every leader's actions must be based on thorough justice, not just formal or procedural justice. Ibn Khaldun in one of his books, namely *Al-Muqoddimah* mentioned:²²

الظلم مؤذن بخراب العمران

"Tyranny is a sign (or cause) of the destruction of civilization (or a country)."

Ibn Khaldun explained how tyranny can bring down a civilization. When the ruler acts unjustly to the people by arbitrarily depriving the people of their rights, the people will lose motivation, thus making the people stop trying (in this case it can mean working, trading, or other productive things). If the hope of the business is lost, this also has the opportunity to trigger the cessation of the country's economic wheels. When the ruler uses the wealth of the state to strengthen his political position instead of distributing it fairly, this is one of the causes of the decline of civilization.

Ibn Taymiyyah in his work *Al-Siyasaḥ al-Syar'iyyah* affirms that

فالمقصود الواجب في الولايات: إصلاح دين الخلق الذي متى فاتهم خسروا خساراً مبيناً ولم ينفعهم ما نعموا به في الدنيا، وإصلاح ما لا يقوم الدين إلا به من أمر دنياهم

*"So the obligatory purpose of leadership/power is: to realize the benefits of the religion of creatures (people) who if it is lost then they will lose with real losses, as well as improve their worldly affairs without which religion will not be able to be fully established."*²³

Leaders are responsible for ensuring that all policies taken have a positive impact on the welfare of the people, not just the image or interests of the rulers.

Third, the principle of *tamkin*, namely strengthening capacity, opportunities can be in the form of assets or resources that allow the

Dan Kontemporer," *Equality: Law and Social* 1 (2025): 27-33, <https://ejournal.risetanakbangsa.id/jhs/article/view/6/5>.

²² Ibnu Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddimah* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2001), h. 286-288. Retrieved 20 June 2026, di https://archive.org/details/muqodimah_202008/page/290/mode/1up (versi terjemahan)

²³ Ibnu Taimiyyah, *Al-Siyasaḥ al-Syar'iyyah fi Ishlahi al-Ra'i wa al-Ra'iyyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1988). Retrieved 6 July 2026 <https://shamela.ws/book/7265/600>

community to achieve community empowerment and independence.²⁴ This principle emphasizes that the role of the government is not only to provide material assistance, but also to create conditions that allow the people to be economically and socially independent. The concept of *fiqh tamkin* developed by contemporary Islamic economists emphasizes that empowerment must build social capital and the productive capacity of society, not create dependency.²⁵

Fourth, the principles of *trust* (responsibility) and *'are* (justice) in leadership. These two principles affirm that a leader is a trustee of the people and of God, so that every decision must be morally accountable. The abuse of state positions or resources for personal or group interests is a form of betrayal of the mandate of leadership. In addition, the Qur'an is the main foundation of the principle of trust in *fiqh siyasah*, which obliges the ruler to convey the mandate to those who have the right and establish the law fairly, as stated in Surah al-Nisa verse 58:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُكُمْ أَنْ تُؤَدُّوا الْأَمَانَاتِ إِلَىٰ أَهْلِهَا وَإِذَا حَكَمْتُمْ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ أَنْ تَحْكُمُوا بِالْعَدْلِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ نِعِمَّا يَعِظُكُمْ بِهِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا

"Indeed, Allah has commanded you to convey the trust to its owner. When you establish the law among men, you shall establish it justly. Indeed, Allah has given you the best teaching. Indeed, Allah is All-Hearing and All-Seeing." (Q.S. An-Nisa: 58)

Analysis of the Conformity of Social Assistance Policy with the Principles of *Fiqh siyasah*

By referring to the empirical data in Tables 1 to 3 and the normative framework above, this section assesses the social assistance policy for the 2022-2026 period on four interrelated dimensions, not as a stand-alone category, but as a single argument about how the procedural legitimacy of a policy can go hand in hand with its substantial-moral legitimacy deficit.

1. Conformity of Social Assistance Policy on Maslahah Mursalah

Social assistance programs designed to protect vulnerable groups are basically in line with the principle of *maslahah mursalah*, because the goal is to meet basic needs and protect the property and souls of the people, two out of the five *maqashid sharia*. However, the legitimacy of *maslahah* is not enough to judge from the normative purpose of the program alone, but also

²⁴ M. Syafi'i Antonio, *Bank Syariah: Teori dan Praktek*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2001. h. 132.

²⁵ Yulizar D. Sanrego dan Moch. Taufik, *Fiqh Tamkin: Fiqh Pemberdayaan: Membangun Modal Sosial dalam Mewujudkan Khairu Ummah* (Jakarta: Qisthi Press, 2016), h. 45-60.

from the pattern of determining the time and amount. The data in Table 2 shows that the highest increase in the social protection budget in the non-pandemic period occurred right in the 2024 election year, while the poverty data in Table 1 does not show a commensurate deterioration in socio-economic conditions in the same period to justify such a large spike, poverty has even declined steadily since March 2023, before the budget increase occurred. When budget increases can be explained more by the election calendar than by the trend of real needs of the community, the program loses some of its normative legitimacy within the framework of *maslahah mursalah*, because *maslahah* requires real, equitable, and long-term oriented benefits, not benefits that are transactional and coincide with political momentum.

مَا مِنْ عَبْدٍ يَسْتَرْعِيهِ اللَّهُ رَعِيَّةً يَمُوتُ يَوْمَ يَمُوتُ وَهُوَ غَاشٌّ لِرَعِيَّتِهِ إِلَّا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ الْجَنَّةَ

"There is not a servant whom Allah entrusts to him the responsibility of leading the people, and then when he dies in a state of deceiving his people, but Allah forbids Paradise for him." (H.R. Muslim: 142)²⁶

The Prophet's words about a leader deceiving his people above become relevant here not as an accusation of the individual intentions of officials, but as a moral framework for judging policy patterns. Assistance that is designed to follow the campaign stages, as seen in the timing of the disbursement of the Food Risk Mitigation BLT in Table 3, risks putting electoral interests above the real interests of the beneficiaries.

2. *Siyasah 'Adilah* and the Problem of Program Personalization

By design, the social assistance program is universal because it targets all community groups registered in the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS) without considering the political preferences of the recipients. However, the reality of the implementation shows deviations from the design. Indications of personalization of programs with certain political figures, as reported to have occurred in the distribution of rice social assistance in a number of areas of Central Java accompanied by photos of presidential candidates,²⁷ show that the state instrument that should be neutral has shifted to a medium of political association. *Fiqh siyasah* rejects any form of policy that prioritizes the interests of the rulers or political elites over the interests of the people, as Ibn Khaldun emphasized that the use of state wealth to strengthen political positions, instead of distributing them fairly, is one of the causes of the decline of civilization. The timing pattern

²⁶ Muslim bin al-Hajjaj, *Shahih Muslim*, Kitab al-Iman, Hadis No. 142. Retrieved 6 July 2026. <https://sunnah.com/muslim:142>

²⁷ Willya Achmad, "Politics and Social Welfare: Dynamics or Social Assistance Programs on Electability in Indonesia," *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)* 9, no. 2 (2024): 205-15, <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v9i2.53634>.

in Table 3, especially the extension of rice social assistance which was originally planned to end in November 2023 but was extended until June 2024 right after the voting period, strengthens the suspicion that the administrative decision is not solely based on the calculation of people's food needs, but also considerations for maintaining the continuity of support during the electoral stage. The incompatibility between universal design and practices segmented by political momentum is contrary to the principle of distributive justice in siyasah 'adilah.

3. Structural Dependence as the Fruit of *Tamkin's* Lack of Quantity

The slowdown in the rate of poverty reduction in Table 1, from a decrease of 0.21 percentage points per semester on average for the 2023 period to around 0.10-0.20 percentage points in the 2024-2025 period even though the budget continues to be increased, indicates a decrease in the marginal effectiveness of each additional rupiah of the social protection budget for poverty alleviation. This pattern is consistent with the finding that the effectiveness of social assistance in reducing structural poverty is still limited because the program is more charitable than transformative,²⁸ as well as the finding that the pattern of recipients' dependence on assistance actually strengthened after the pandemic instead of decreasing.²⁹ In terms of the composition of the 2026 State Budget budget, for example, the allocation of Rp315.5 trillion for "meeting basic needs" is much greater than the Rp86.2 trillion for "community empowerment",³⁰ a ratio that quantitatively confirms the dominance of a charitable approach over a transformative approach in the national social assistance policy structure. Fiqh siyasah through the concept of tamkin emphasizes that the task of leaders is not just to meet the immediate needs of the people, but to build the foundation so that the people are able to meet their own needs; policies that structurally create dependence, as reflected in the budget ratio, are contrary to the principle of kifayah which requires true sufficiency, not long-term dependence.

4. Politicization of Social Assistance as a Neglect of Trust

The defense that the social protection budget is an instrument of the State Budget that has been discussed and approved with the House of

²⁸ Palupi Lindiasari Samputra dan Aji Wahyu Ramadhani, "Efektivitas Bantuan Sosial Dalam Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Di Tengah Perlambatan Ekonomi Indonesia Dengan Pendekatan Non-Parametrik," *Jurnal Perspektif Ekonomi Darussalam* 5, no. 1 (2019): 9-31, <https://doi.org/10.24815/jped.v5i1.14227>.

²⁹ Nanda Salsabila et al., "Analisis Efektivitas Bantuan Sosial (Bansos) Dalam Mengatasi Kemiskinan Di Indonesia," *Journal of Macroeconomics and Social Development* 1, no. 4 (2024): 1-13, <https://doi.org/10.47134/jmsd.v1i4.317>.

³⁰ Infobanknews, "Sri Mulyani Siapkan Rp508,2 Triliun untuk Anggaran Perlindungan Sosial 2026," Retrived 2 July 2026, <https://infobanknews.com/sri-mulyani-siapkan-rp5082-triliun-untuk-anggaran-perlindungan-sosial-2026/>.

Representatives³¹ confirms the procedural legitimacy of the policy, but procedural legitimacy is not substantive legitimacy in fiqh siyasah. Amanah demands moral accountability for policy intentions and impacts, not just compliance with legislation mechanisms. Even though the social assistance budget is legally positive, the scheduling of its disbursement that coincides with the campaign stage and voting day, the personalization of programs with certain political figures, and the pattern of budget increases and decreases that follow the electoral calendar cumulatively form a pattern that a number of researchers categorize as non-cash vote-based buying, namely the use of state-financed social programs as an instrument to obtain electoral support that substantially undermines the integrity of the election.³² From the perspective of fiqh siyasah, this kind of pattern is classified as an abuse of power that ignores the mandate of leadership, because state resources that should be distributed purely based on need are actually calculated to maintain or increase political power. The consequences are moral, not just administrative: a leader whose policies, in their pattern and timing, place electoral calculations side by side with the interests of the people, have harmed the principle of trust which is one of the main requirements of legitimate leadership in Islam, regardless of whether or not there is a positive rule of law that explicitly prohibits the practice.

Recommendations for Fiqh-Based Social Assistance Policy Reform

The findings of the study show the need to strengthen policy direction through several strategic steps. This study formulated four recommendations. First, the policy orientation needs to shift from meeting short-term needs to sustainable structural empowerment, by increasing the proportion of the community empowerment budget, which is currently much smaller than the budget for meeting basic needs, so that the social assistance program moves from a charitable pattern to a transformative pattern according to the tamkin principle. Second, transparency and accountability in the determination of beneficiaries need to be strengthened through regular updates and open public access to social welfare databases, accompanied by independent monitoring mechanisms involving civil society. Third, a firm and legally enforceable separation is needed between the social assistance distribution schedule and the election stage, for example through a moratorium on scheme changes and the schedule for the disbursement of social assistance in a certain period of time before voting

³¹ Kompas.tv, "Kucuran Bansos di Tahun Pemilu 2024 Lebih Besar dari Pandemi Covid-19 2021-2022," Retrieved 2 July 2026, <https://www.kompas.tv/nasional/481565/kucuran-bansos-di-tahun-pemilu-2024-lebih-besar-dari-pandemi-covid-19-2021-2022?page=all>.

³² Anggraeinni Anggraeinni et al., "Bantuan Sosial Sebagai Instrumen Politik Uang Non-Tunai dalam Pemilu Indonesia," *Jurnal USM Law Review* 9, no. 2 (2026): 1253-1272, <https://doi.org/https://journals.usm.ac.id/index.php/julr/article/view/13655/7136>.

day, accompanied by a reformulation of election regulations that accommodate the policy-based non-cash vote buying category as a form of electoral violation.³³ Fourth, strengthening the value of trust and siyasah 'adilah in the bureaucratic culture needs to be carried out through education and ethical coaching of public officials, considering that *fiqh siyasah* emphasizes that good leadership is not only a matter of procedural compliance, but also moral integrity which is reflected in every policy decision.

CONCLUSION

Comparative data for the 2022-2026 period shows that the increase in the social protection budget in Indonesia, especially the 12 percent surge in the 2024 election year which was then corrected downward in the 2025 non-electoral year, cannot be fully explained by the real need for poverty reduction, which actually slowed down in the same period. This pattern, coupled with the indication of program personalization and scheduling of disbursements that coincide with the campaign stage and voting day, shows that social assistance policies in Indonesia contain serious normative problems when viewed through the framework of *fiqh siyasah*. Social assistance programs distributed with electoral considerations lose the legitimacy of the *maslahah mursalah* and are contrary to siyasah 'adilah which requires comprehensive distributive justice. The dominance of the budget for meeting basic needs over the community empowerment budget shows that the policy is structurally still charitable, contrary to the principles of *tamkin* and *kifayah* which require independence, not long-term dependence. Furthermore, the pattern of politicization of social assistance is a form of abandonment of the principle of trust, because procedural legitimacy through legislative approval does not necessarily meet the demands of moral accountability of leadership in Islam. The normative consequence of these findings is the need for social assistance governance reform which includes strengthening empowerment, transparency of beneficiary data, strict separation between the social assistance distribution schedule and election stages, and strengthening the moral integrity of the bureaucracy. This research has limitations because it relies on normative-qualitative approaches and official secondary data; Follow-up research in the form of field studies or case studies in specific areas is needed to further validate the patterns found in these studies.

³³ Anggraeinni Anggraeinni et al., "Bantuan Sosial Sebagai Instrumen Politik Uang Non-Tunai dalam Pemilu Indonesia," *Jurnal USM Law Review* 9, no. 2 (2026): 1253-1272, <https://doi.org/https://journals.usm.ac.id/index.php/julr/article/view/13655/7136>.

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